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INTRODUCTION
If men were angels, no governmient would be necessapy.
-The Federalist'
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants from
most government appeals of acquittals, even where "the acquittal w -as
based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation."2 The ability to ap-
- BA., Reed College, 1995;J.D., Cornell Law School, 2001.
1 THE FEDERAuSr No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
2 Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam).
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peal criminal verdicts is asymmetrical. 3 When a court or jury finds a
criminal defendant not guilty, that determination is normally unassail-
able, because the losing party-the government-may not appeal."
Criminal defendants, on the other hand, may appeal.,' There is one
exception to this asymmetry-prosecutors may appeal purely legal de-
terminations which would require no further fact-finding. 6 Determin-
ing whether appeal is available thus hinges on whether the issue to be
appealed implicates solely legal determinations. Because prosecutors
so seldomly attempt to appeal acquittals, virtually no case law con-
fronts the law-fact distinction in the acquittal appeal context.7 In fact,
law-fact distinction jurisprudence suggests the exception permitting
acquittal appeals is far more broad than recognized. 8
Although the following discussion is limited to federal bench tri-
als,9 constitutional double jeopardy protections have been applied to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment since 1969.10 A novel per-
spective on the scope of constitutional prosecutorial appeals thus im-
plicates both federal and state actions. Federal bench decisions are
particularly amenable to review because a federal rule of criminal pro-
cedure requires judges to "find the facts specially" at a party's re-
quest." Explicit factual findings are indispensable in determining
3 This asymmetry does not apply until after "jeopardy" has "attached." Injury trials,
jeopardy attaches at the empaneling of the jury. In a bench trial, jeopardy attaches at the
swearing in of the first witness. Grist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 29 (1978); Serfass v. United
States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
4 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
8 See infra Part II.
9 One drawback to permitting government appeals from bench trials alone is that
criminal defendants might choose jury trials in order to forestall any danger of appeal. See,
e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINALJusawCE REP, No, 6,
REPORT TO THE ATroRNEY GENERAL ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND GOVERNMENT APPEALs O
AcQurrrALs (1987), ierinted in 22 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 831, 896 (1989) [hereinafter Or.
FICE OF LEGAL Poucy]. But as the Office of Legal Policy reports:
It is not at all clear that the proposed case law clarification would substan-
tially affect a defendant's incentive to opt for ajury trial. Moreover, assum-
ing proper federal courtjudicial supervision ofjury trials, it is not apparent
to what extentjury trials are more likely to yield wrongful acquittals. Finally,
any wrongful acquittals attributable to jury trials would have to be weighed
against any fall in wrongful acquittals stemming from government appeals
of bench trial verdicts.
Id. at 896-97.
Courts could avert pro-jury trial bias by permitting appeals of errors of law from spe-
cial verdicts injury trials (and expanding use of such special verdicts) or disposing of prob-
lematic legal issues pretrial, when government appeal is generally still available. For a
recommendation for further study on the constitutionality of the former, see id. For advo-
cacy of the wisdom of the latter, see Kate Stith, The Risk of LegalError in Criminal Cases: Some
Consequences of the Asymmetliy in the Right to Appea4 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 54 & n.140 (1990).
10 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
11 FED. R. CriaM. P. 23(c).
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whether an error was purely legal and would require no further fact-
finding. In 1999, bench trials accounted for roughly one-quarter of
federal criminal trials.12
The rule prohibiting acquittal appeals is least controversial when
a judge acquits a clearly innocent defendant. But judges sometimes
err. At worst, "federal judges 'can be lazy, lack judicial temperament
. . . [and] pursue a nakedly political agenda' without fear of re-
moval."13 As the volumes of the Federal Reporter'4 make clear, judges,
in the view of other judges, sometimes get the law wrong. Normally,
these "wrong" decisions may be corrected on appeal. Circuit courts
correct district courts, and the Supreme Court corrects the circuits.
This simple hierarchy collapses in this one comer of criminal law-
acquittals-where the decisions ofjudges, even if "egregiously errone-
ous" are often immune from review, and thus uncorrectable.
But the Court has interpreted the DoubleJeopardy Clause to pro-
hibit most acquittal appeals for very good reasons. Defending oneself
in any lawsuit is onerous. When the government is the plaintiff and
the liability a prison term or death, the pressures of legal defense are
substantial. Prolonging an individual defendant's exposure to these
pressures may be unduly oppressive. Justice Black phrased this con-
cern memorably in Green v. United State..'-
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.16
Permitting government appeal protracts the hardship of criminal de-
fense. To lessen the already substantial burden on criminal defend-
ants, the Court has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause to
prohibit many government appeals.
12 SouRcEBooK OF CPIINAL, JusncE STATISTICS 1999: BL REA OF JUSTICE SrTAIMs
451 tbl.5.48 (Kathleen Maguire ed., 2000).
13 Neal Devins, Reanimator Mark Tushnet and the Second Coming of the Imperial President,
34 U. RicH. L REv. 359, 364 (2000) (quoting PicF-XR A. POSNEM OT.rco.nI¢; Lw. 111
(1995) (alteration in original)); cf. Barry Friedman, The Histoiy of the Countmnajoritarian
DiffwOuty: Law's Politics (pt. 4), 148 U. P. L RE%. 971, 972-73 (2000) (noting protections
that insulate judges from political influences).
14 The Federal Reporter contains the opinions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. BLwI's
LAw DiCaioNARY 612 (6th ed. 1990).
15 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (5-4 decision).
16 Id. at 187-88; see United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975) (quoting Green,
355 U.S. at 187), overruMed United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); United States v.
Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 737 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotingJendtks, 420 U.S. at 370 (quoting Green,
355 U.S. at 187)), rdt'gen bane denieA 181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999).
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The Court has traditionally interpreted the Clause by weighing
the defendant's interest in closure against the state's interest in accu-
rate adjudications.' 7 Justices have disagreed on the relative weight of
these interests, but accuracy and finality have remained the primary
constitutional stakes. Consider Palko v. Connecticut,' in which the
Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of acquittal appeals in state
courts. 19 Justice Cardozo, noting the opportunity for defendants to
correct adverse error, observed that "[t]he edifice ofjustice stands, its
symmetry, to many, greater than before."20 Injustice Cardozo's Palho
analysis, accuracy outweighed finality. The balancing of these two
constitutional stakes-the public interest against the defendant's in-
terest-recurs throughout double jeopardyjurisprudence. When the
Court overturned Palko in 1968, the majority emphasized the defen-
dant's interest in finality.21
The constitutional interests at stake in double jeopardy jurispru-
dence are interesting-but they also bear a marked contemporary rel-
evance. In a recent case, United States v. Lynch, federal prosecutors
attempted to appeal an acquittal.2 2 The Second Circuit panel's opin-
ion grounded its lack of jurisdiction on constitutional double jeop-
ardy grounds, although an appeal would have entailed no further fact-
finding.2 3 This recent rift within an erudite court punctuates just how
controversial and unresolved are the parameters of the pure law ex-
ception.24 Six months later, the Second Circuit denied the request for
an en banc rehearing, despite half of the circuit voting in favor (a
majority was required to hear the case). 25 Although the Constitution
tolerates acquittal appeals which entail no further fact-finding, appel-
17 See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 145 (1962) (Clark, J. dissenting). Corn.
pare Green, 355 U.S. at 187 ("[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity... ."), with id. at 218-19 (FrankfurterJ., dissent-
ing) (balancing defendant's rights of freedom from "oppression" against the "counter-
vailing interest in the vindication of criminal justice").
18 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
19 Id. at 328.
20 Id.
21 Benton, 395 U.S. at 795-96. For another expression of the competing principle, see
Justice Clark's Fong Foo dissent: "It is fundamental in our criminal jurisprudence that the
public has a right to have a person who stands legally indicted by a grandjury publicly tried
on the charge." 369 U.S. at 145 (Clark, J., dissenting).
22 162 F.3d 732, 733 (2d Cir. 1998), reh'gen banc denied, 181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999).
23 See infra notes 138, 170-72 and accompanying text.
24 See Lynch, 181 F.3d at 330.
25 See id. ("Judges Kearse, Leval, Cabranes, Parker, Pooler, and Sotoinayor dissent
from the denial of en banc reconsideration."). The affirmative vote of a majority of the
active judges on the circuit are required to trigger en banc review. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
(1994). Cf Peter Michael Madden, Comment, In Banc Procedures in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 43 FoRDHNsi L. REv. 401, 420 (1974) (suggesting en banc review should be per-
mitted without a majority); Note, Playing with Numbers: Determining the Mlajority of Judges
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late courts have been loathe to discern a case which meets the excep-
tion.26 If "[o]ne of the distinctive characteristics of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is the infrequency of rehear-
ings in banc,"27 the Lynch case may portend a sea change in double
jeopardy law. If federal prosecutors can convince another panel, as
they nearly did in the Second Circuit, then some circuit may soon
hear a prosecutorial appeal of an acquittal. But Lynch also exposes
some difficulties in the practice of permitting acquittal appeals. No
dearth of controversy exists over the theoretical underpinnings of
double jeopardy jurisprudence-the constitutional interests at stake-
but Lynch demonstrates that even if acquittal appeals are permitted in
theory, difficulties remain in the practice, the mechanics, of acquittal
appeals. The mechanics of acquittal appeals are the subject of this
Note.
Under current doublejeopardy case law, a prosecutor may appeal
purely legal findings. 28 As a threshold to appeal, a prosecutor must
demonstrate that the putative error is a legal holding, and not a fac-
tual finding. Yet the classification of a determination as factual or le-
gal is a flexible, policy-driven exercise. Sometimes, as in the Lynch
case, review would clearly implicate no further fact-finding. At other
Required to Grant En Bane Sittings in the United States Courts of Appeals, 70 VA. L REV. 1505,
1511-20 (1984) (surveying different approaches among circuits).
For a provocative editorial on dissents from denials of en banc hearings, see Indep.
Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 965 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (sepa-
rate statement of Randolph,J.), rev'd sub norn. U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am.,
Inc., 508 U.S. 439 (1993). Here Judge Randolph noted:
Many years ago two wise judges found it a "dubious policy" if "any ac-
tive judge may publish a dissent from any decision, although he did not
participate in it and the Court has declined to review it en bane thereafter
... especially since, if the issue is of real importance, further opportunities
for expression will assuredly occur."
Id. (separate statement of Randolph, J.) (citing United States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hart-
ford R.R., 276 F.2d 525, 553 (2d Cir. 1960) (statement of Friendly,J., joined by Lumbard,
C.J.) (alteration in original)).
26 For further discussion, see iqfra note 122.
27 Jon 0. Newman, In Bane Practice in the Second Circuit: The Wirtues of Restraint, 50
BRooK. L REv. 365, 365 (1984); see also id. at 380 ("As is true of the pattern of cases agreed
to be reheard in banc, the most significant aspect of the Second Circuit's in banc polling is
how infrequently it occurs. In the past five years, only 27 polls have been requested.").
The standard for en banc review is generall) rather limited: "An en banc hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc considera-
tion is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the pro-
ceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." FED. IL AP,. P. 35(a). This recent
rift within an erudite court punctuatesjust how controversial and unresolved is the prohi-
bition on acquittal appeals, and the pure law exception.
28 See, eg., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 (1975) ("[A) defendant has no
legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error could be corrected ,ithout
subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier of fact."); see also OrncE or LEc%.
Poucy, supra note 9, at 893-97 (recommending that the Justice Department develop a
program aimed at vindicating a prosecutor's capacity to appeal certain acquittals).
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times, whether the inquiry is legal or factual is more difficult to dis-
cern. This Note argues that law-fact distinction jurisprudence encour-
ages appellate courts to construe inquiries as legal in the context of
acquittal appeals. By liberally construing inquiries as legal, courts of
appeal can review acquittals without disturbing Court precedent. De-
fendants would not be subject to additional trials, but trial court rul-
ings could be reviewed. Given the pliability of the law-fact distinction,
and the desirability of appellate review of judicial errors, significant
opportunities exist to broadly permit appeals of acquittals in a sympa-
thetic circuit or Court.
Although a law-fact distinction inquiry is a threshold to any ac-
quittal appeal, the interaction between law-fact distinction jurispru-
dence and double jeopardy law has never been critically examined.
Authorities have characterized both areas independently as murky.29
This Note attempts to shine some light into this morass, in an effort to
render translucent the overlap of these two opaque spheres. Part I
briefly surveys double jeopardy jurisprudence, surveying how the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly affirmed the constitutionality of appeals
of acquittals which would require no further fact-finding. Although
the Supreme Court's statements on the subject should be conclusive,
Part I reexamines some of the policy factors bearing in favor of acquit-
tal appeals of legal determinations. Far more persuasive authorities
have discussed these policies extensively elsewhere 3 0-this Note
glosses that already substantial body of work, adding some novel analy-
sis, particularly regarding judicial nullification. Using Lynch as an ex-
ample, Part II explores the mechanics of appeals through the lens of
the law-fact distinction. The constitutionality of acquittal appeals of
legal error and the pro-review orientation of the law-fact distinction in
this context both bear in favor of far more acquittal appeals.
29 See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) ("T]he appropriate methodol-
ogy for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least,
elusive."); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (observing double jeopardy
"decisional law ... is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most
intrepid judicial navigator.").
30 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (Cardozo,J.) (8-1 decision),
ovemled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100, 135 (1904) (Holmes,J., dissenting); OFFICE OF LEGAL Poticy, supra note 9; Akhil Reed
Amar, DoubleJeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE LJ. 1807 (1997);James A. Strazzella, The
Relationship of Double Jeopardy to Prosecution Appeals, 73 NoTRE Dia L. Rnv. 1 (1997).
[Vol. 86:11311136
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I
A BRmaE SURVEY OF DOUBLE JEOP.ARDY L.,'
The doctrine of doublejeopardy is an ancient one,3' perhaps uni-
versal among systems of adjudication. 32 The Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment provides that "[no] person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."33 Despite
the simplicity of the Clause, the related law is far from straightfor-
ward.34 As one Justice observed, "the decisional law ... is a veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judi-
cial navigator."3 5 Commentators and courts have proposed numer-
ous-and at times conflicting-policies in appl)ing double
jeopardy.36
31 See United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 737-39 (2d Cir. 1998) (Sack, J., concur-
ring), reh'g en banc denied 181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999); NfuR-n- L FfuEDL-.No, DouIt.E
JEOPARDY 5-16 (1969); GEORGE C. THo.tAS II, DouBtEJEo .um: THE Htsrov, -n1E Lw 1
(1998) ("[L]aws against changing a final judgment can be traced to die Code of Hammu-
rabi.");Jay A. Sigler, A Histoiy of DoubleJeopardy, 7 Ai.J. LEou. Htsr. 283, 283 (1963) ("The
principle of double jeopardy was not entirely unknown to the Greeks and Romans. . . ").
32 See THoMAs, supra note 31, at 1 ("No legal system can survive without some bar
against relitigating the same issue over and over."); see, e.g., OmrFcE OF LErt.L PoUao supra
note 9, at 885-88 (France, Japan, Italy, and several countries within the British Common-
wealth); FiEnl---zD, supra note 31 (England); K.N. Ct-, NDRAsE s Ltv'z Pit.Lu, DOtvuLEJEop.
ARDY PRoTacroN: A CompAm'E OERrIEw (1988) (India, England, Canada and the
U.S.); R. A. Moodie, Autrefois Acquit and Autrefois Convict in New Zealand Criminal Laru (pt.
1), 1974 N.Z. UJ. 169 (New Zealand); R. A. Moodie, Autrfois Acquit and Convict in Canada
and New Zealand, 17 CRuM . LQ. 72 (1974) (Canada and New Zealand) [hereinafter
Moodie, Canada and New Zealand]; Thomas E. Towe, Fundamental Rigltts in the Sotiet Union:
A Comparative Approach, 115 U. P.A. L Rxv. 1251 (1967) (former U.S.S.R.); Gary DiBianco,
Note, Truly Constitutional? The American Double Jeopardy Clause and Its Australian Analkues
33 A.mo. Cua.i. L Rxv. 123 (1995) (Australia).
33 U.S. Cosr. amend. V. Note the similarity to the language of the English common-
law doctrine: "a man shall not be brought into danger of his life for one and the same
offence more than once." Moodie, Canada and New 7aland, supra note 32, at 72 (citing 2
WILJAM HAWINS, TREVAnSE OF THE PLVS OF THE CRoWN 368 (1721)).
34 See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981); Lnch, 162 F.3d at 738
(Sack,J., concurring); THo.mAs, supra note 31; Amar, supra note 30, at 1807-09.
35 Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, J.).
36 See, eg., Lynd, 162 F.3d at 737, 738 (to protect private citizens from the power of
the state); THomms, supra note 31, at 1, 215, 219 (principles ofjudicial economy); Amar,
supra note 30, at 1815 n.48 (protecting the "innocent from erroneous conviction") (em-
phasis omitted); id. at 1834-35 (to protect defendants from prosecutorial vindictiveness);
Thomas L DiBiagio, Judicial Equity: An Argument for Post-Acquittal Retrial 117uen the Judicial
Process Is Fundamentally Defective, 46 CTaH. U. L RE%. 77, 89 (1996) (i[to] prevent (te
prosecutor] from improving upon the weaknesses in his original argument" (discussing
United States v. i on, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975))). Compare Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187 (1957) (5-4 decision) ("[T]he State id all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.... ."), with id. at 218-19 (FrankfurterJ., dissent-
ing) (balancing defendant's rights of freedom from "oppression" against the 'counter-
vailing interest in the vindication of criminal justice").
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Some core touchstones are discemable however. Currently, the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants in government-initiated
penalty actions3 7 from multiple exposures to determinations of culpa-
bility,38 conducted by the same sovereign3 9 arising out of the same
alleged conduct.40 In other words, the same government entity can-
not try criminal defendants twice for the same crime.
A. Acquittal Appeals
The focus of this Note lies outside the core protections discussed
above. Although nowhere expressly stated in the Clause, double jeop-
ardy currently prohibits appeals of most acquittals.41 Current criminal
procedure permits post-conviction appeals. 42 In other words, defend-
ants may appeal guilty verdicts while prosecutors may not appeal ad-
verse rulings after jeopardy has attached. The criminal appellate
process is asymmetrical.
But Supreme Court reasoning and dicta reveal an exception to
this prohibition on appeals of acquittals. Prosecutorial appeals are
permitted when the error is purely legal, and no further fact-finding
would be necessary. 43 Thus:
Although review of any ruling of law discharging a defendant obvi-
ously enhances the likelihood of conviction and subjects him to
continuing expense and anxiety, a defendant has no legitimate
claim to benefit from an error of law when that error could be cor-
37 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("life or limb"); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98-
99 (1997); Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 170 (1873); William H. Comley, Former
Jeopardy, 35 YALE LJ. 674, 675-76 (1926) (interpreting "life or limb" to mean criminal as
opposed to civil cases); Kevin M. Smith et al., Double Jeopardy, Twenty-Eighth Annual Reviw of
Criminal Procedure, 87 GEO. LJ. 1475, 1475-77 (1999); cf Amar, supra note 30, at 1807, 1810-
12 (criticizing expansion of double jeopardy protection to some civil actions).
38 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("twice put in jeopardy"); Lynch, 162 F.3d at 738; Amar,
supra note 30, at 1808-09; Smith et al., supra note 37, at 1478-79, 1496-1501.
39 See United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Smith et al,, supra
note 37, at 1501-05.
40 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("same offense"); Amar, supra note 30, at 1807, 1813-37;
Smith et al., supra note 37, at 1488-96.
41 SeeArizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); United States v. Jenkins, 420
U.S. 358, 365-66 (1975), overruled by United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192, 198
(1957). Supplemental findings are also barred following a reversal "because of insuficient
evidence.., or [following] a mistrial ruling not prompted by manifest necessity." Sivisher
v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 218 (1978) (internal citation omitted).
42 See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 339-40 (1985) (acknowledging defendant's right to
appeal convictions); DiBiagio, supra note 36, at 77 n.1; cf id., at 81 ("At the time the Fifth
Amendment was adopted, there was no judicial review after a judgment in a criminal
case.").
43 See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-30 (1980); Swisher, 438 U.S. at
218; Scott, 437 U.S. at 91, 99-100; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
569-70 (1977);Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 365, 370; United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S, 332, 3,4445,
353 (1975); Lynch, 162 F.3d at 735; OFFCE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 9, at 894 n.260.
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rected without subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier
of fact.44
A similar exception exists in Canada, where prosecutorial appeal is
permitted "on a question of law alone."45 A number of other com-
mon-law countries follow the Canadian approach, including India,
New Zealand, Sri Lanka, and South Africa.46 England, notably, does
not permit such appeals.47 Most civil-law countries permit review of
legal questions following acquittals.48
Earlier double jeopardy jurisprudence supports permitting ap-
peals of purely legal questions following acquittal. For example, in
United States v. Wilson the Court observed, "[t]he development of the
DoubleJeopardy Clause from its common-law origins thus suggests...
[the Clause was not directed] at Government appeals, at least where
those appeals would not require a new trial."49 Analysis of early au-
thorities, including Coke, Hawkins, and Hale, supports the Court's
observation. 50
In dicta, the Supreme Court has construed the Double Jeopardy
Clause to permit prosecutorial appeals of purely legal issues. Ordina-
rily, Supreme Court dicta is persuasive authority.5' Precedent alone
should be enough to require lower courts to hear appeals of acquittals
which require no further fact-finding. Reasonable minds can disagree
on the precise boundaries of the exception, as evidenced by the re-
cent even split within the Second Circuit. -2 Although the Court has
traditionally balanced a defendant's interest in finality against the gov-
ernment's interest in accuracy, some additional factors also appear in
Court opinions. As background to discerning the limits of the excep-
tion, this Note now briefly surveys some of the policies for and against
a prohibition of acquittal appeals of legal issues.
44 Wilson, 420 U.S. at 345; see also JenkiyL% 420 U.S at 365 ("[The Double Jeopardy
Clause does not prohibit an appeal by the Government providing that a retrial would not
be required in the event the Government is successful in its appeal.").
45 C. David Freeman, Double Jeopardy Protection in Canada: A Consideration of Dtveop-
mert, Doctrine and a Current Controverzy. 12 CaM. UJ. 3, 19-22 (1988).
46 OFFICE OF LEGAL Poucv, supra note 9, at 887.
47 Id. at 885-86.
48 Id. at 887-88 (discussing generally and speci4ing France andJapan).
49 1ilson, 420 U.S. at 342.
50 See THoMAS, supra note 31, at 261-62 (discussing the historical roots of doublejeop-
ardy in Coke, Hawkins, and Hale).
51 See Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 115, 120 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc); United States v. Bell,
524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975) (Supreme Court dicta "must be given considerable
weight"); Leis v. Sara, 602 F. Supp. 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); cf. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and
Article !!, 142 U. PA. L REv. 1997, 2026 (suggesting some lower courts reject the view that
superior court dicta is binding, although concluding "prudent lower courts" will follow
dicta).
52 See United States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330, 333 (2d Cir. 1999) (Cabranes, J., dissent-
ing), reh'g en banc denie4, 181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999).
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B. Policies and Constitutional Stakes
The policies and stakes discussed below are largely culled from
double jeopardy jurisprudence and scholarship. Because the case law
regarding acquittal appeals of legal issues is marked most distinctly by
its paucity, this Note imports liberally from general discussions of ac-
quittal appeals.
1. Finality Versus Accuracy
The constitutional analysis has traditionally weighed the state's
interest in accuracy against the burden to an individual defendant in
defending the appeal. 53 The "State with all its resources and power"r5 "
policy is the most oft cited in favor of finality.55 The state has ample
resources, while criminal defendants are often "too poor to afford pri-
vate counsel."56 Under this approach, some guilty defendants are ac-
quitted in order to protect all defendants from overreaching by the
state.5
7
Prosecutors, commentators, and dissenters argue accuracy does
outweigh finality.58 As one commentator notes, "[t]he community in-
curs an incalculable expense when the vast machinery constructed to
bring criminals to justice can be felled by the simple error of a single
unreviewable judge."59 Greater accuracy decreases acquittals of guilty
defendants. 60 Public perceptions of inaccuracy and inconsistency in
the legal system may lessen the deterrent effect of punishment. 1 Nor
53 See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 218-19 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
54 Green, 355 U.S. at 187.
55 See, e.g., supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
56 WilliamJ. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. Rlv. 781, 786 (1988). Criminal
defendant demographics have changed somewhat in the last quarter century. Since the
1970s, federal prosecutors have become "increasingly interested in white collar offenses
and, more recently, in the prosecution of drug related offenses." Id. at 787. Some defend-
ants today can afford vigorous defense and expensive representation. Id.
57 See, e.g., Lynch, 162 F.3d at 740 (Sack, J., concurring) ("We may assume .... that
inasmuch as judges are human and the trial process imperfect, some of the acquittals re-
sulted in the guilty going free .... There is a price, but it is one carefully exacted by the
Fifth Amendment.").
58 See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T~here is more danger that criminals will escape justice than that they will be subjected
to tyranny."); supra note 20 and accompanying text.
59 ScottJ. Shapiro, Reviewing the Unreviewable Judge: Federal Prosecution Appeals of Mid-
Tial Evidentiary Rulings, 99 YAE L.J. 905, 906 (1990).
60 See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Foreword to OFFIcE oF LEGA PotucA, supra note 9 (arguing
in favor of greater appellate review of acquittals in order to better "protect innocent peo-
ple from the depredations of criminals"); Stith, supra note 9, at 34.
61 See DiBiagio, supra note 36, at 107; cf Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the Doctrine of
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel 76 MICH. L. Rxv. 612, 618-19 (1978) (noting that sanctions
perceived as randomly imposed lose their deterrent effect).
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are the government's financial resources limitless.62 If the criminal
justice system is an effective response to crime, increased accuracy
means that society is more effectively processing crime.
Permitting defendants free appeal while handicapping
prosecutorial appeal is asymmetrical. Asymmetrical appeal deviates
from the adversarial system's archetype.6 3 In a criminal justice system
in which accuracy is the primary goal, barring some other asymmetry,
appeals of acquittals and convictions should be roughly equal." Be-
cause they are unbalanced, asymmetrical appeals are less reliable de-
terminations of culpability.65 For example, when courts abandoned
the mutuality doctrine in civil actions, inaccurate determinations be-
came more likely.6 6 The asymmetrical apportionment of the capacity
to appeal skews the likelihood of success in the criminal adjudication
process in favor of the defendant. 67
But the analogy with the civil system is suspect. After all, "[tihe
harm caused by a false acquittal... is not the crime itself but failure to
punish the crime-which, given the uncertain benefits of punish-
ment, is a significantly different matter."o8 Although the justice sys-
tem strives to accurately identify and sanction criminal actors, the
Constitution instantiates a competing goal-protecting citizens from
false or unfair convictions.69 Weighing the repugnance of a false con-
viction-of sending an innocent person to jail7 0-inaccuracy may be
more acceptable. Recent investigations have documented some dis-
turbing antidefendant inaccuracies in state justice systems. For exam-
ple, the error rate for false capital convictions in Illinois may exceed
62 SeeJames Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosrutorial Pawer, 94 I-L,%v. L RE%-. 1521,
1542-43 (1981).
63 One obvious way to ensure symmetry would be for the legislature to deny criminal
defendants the right to appeal. Criminal defendant appeal is permitted by legislative
grace-it is not constitutionally protected. See Marc M. Arkin, Rahiddng the Constitutional
Right to a Ciminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L RE,. 503, 503-04 (1992); Harlon Leigh Dalton, Tah-
ing the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Serioush., 95 Yu. 1J. 62, 62 nA (1985). This Note does
not entertain legislative retraction of defendant appeals as a reasonable response to court-
imposed doublejeopardy appeal asymmetry. For a digest of policy weighing against such a
rescission, see Dalton, supra, at 101-03.
64 See Stith, supra note 9, at 5.
65 See, e.g., DiBiagio, supra note 36, at 107 (contrastingJustice Powell's dissent in Bull-
ington v. Missouri 451 U.S. 430 (1981), suggesting appeals of acquittals lead to greater
accuracy, ithJusfice Brennan's dissent in Unitcd Statesv. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), insisting
the contrary); Stith, supra note 9, at 3.
66 Note, supra note 61, at 619, 622-24, 640-43, 645, 679.
67 Stith, supra note 9, at 3.
68 Stephen J. Ced & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Cildren: Scientific Re -
search and Legal Implications, 86 CoRNru. L REv. 33, 76 (2000).
69 E.g., U.S. CONsT. amends. IV-VI, XIV; hI re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
70 See, eg., 4 Wxi-Ast BLcKSrONE, COsWsiE.Nrr.RIuEs *352 ("[1]t is better that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."); Ceci & Friedman, supra note 68, at 74-76;
Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L RE%. 173, 173-77 (1997) (contemplating the
appropriate ratio of false to true convictions).
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three percent.7' Although both the civil and criminal systems rely on
an adversarial approach, perhaps criminal adjudications should be
less accurate, with the burden of that handicap borne by the state.
Other commentators respond that if the government's resources
make the criminal justice process unfair, a crude prohibition on
prosecutorial appeals is an inappropriate remedy.72 A direct response
would more effectively respond. For example, a few states and the
Congress have recently moved toward providing greater resources to
court-appointed lawyers for indigent defendants. 73 By directly coun-
tering the government's superior resources, such a response increases
fairness, without sacrificing accuracy. Procedural protections such as
the higher standard of proof ("beyond a reasonable doubt") already
distinguish criminal adjudications from the civil paradigm, decreasing
the likelihood that the innocent will be convicted at the cost of in-
creasing the probability that guilty parties will be freed.74
2. Externalities
The distortion of the adversarial system attributable to the prohi-
bition on acquittal appeals may have repercussions which extend
outside the realm of criminal procedure. Commentators have sug-
gested asymmetrical appeals encourage plea bargains,751 prompt
lawmakers to find other routes via which to ensure conviction,7" and
motivate misconduct by defense attorneys.77 When the prosecution
has no forum in which to complain, trial judges who find being over-
turned on appeal distasteful have an incentive to favor the defendant.
One commentator observes that "[m]uch anecdotal evidence suggests
that inferior courtjudges fear being reversed on appeal because their
71 Leigh B. Bienen, The Quality ofJustice in Capital Cases: Illinois as a Case Study, Lxiv &
CoNTrENIP. PROBs., Autumn 1998, at 193, 214 ("In Illinois, ten persons have been freed
since 1977-eight in the last four years-from Illinois's death row because of acquittals on
retrial or prosecutorial decisions to drop further charges. This constitutes a rate of error of
more than three percent.").
72 See, e.g., infra notes 75-80 (citing commentators discussing distortions of criminal
law arising from the prohibition of post-acquittal appeals).
73 SeeJohn Harwood, Death Reconsidered: Despite McVeigh Case, Curbs on Executions Are
Gaining Support, WALL ST.J., May 22, 2001, atAl ("Arkansas and North Carolina[ ] have ...
beeffed] up standards or taxpayer funds for the representation of indigent defendants ....
U.S. Rep. Ray LaHood .... is co-sponsoring the Innocence Protection Act, which would
encourage states to provide death-row convicts with access to DNA testing and 'competent
counsel.'").
74 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; V. C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability heory
and Standards of Proof 14 VA,". L. REv. 807, 815-17 (1961); Ceci & Friedman, supra note 68,
at 74; Stith, supra note 9, at 3.
75 Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 153, 153 (1989).
76 Daniel K. Mayers & Fletcher L. Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Pros-
ecutions, 74 I-ARv. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1960).
77 Justin Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 508-10 (1927).
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professional audience (colleagues, practitioners, and scholars) may
question their legal judgement or abilities."78 Pro-prosecutor judges
have the opposite incentive. As Professor Andrew Leipold notes,
"It]he absolute finality of an acquittal thus may lead a cautious judge
to give the government the benefit of the doubt, particularly if there is
strong evidence of the defendant's guilt."79 Professor Kate Stith has
argued asymmetrical appeal even distorts substantive criminal law by
manipulating the issues heard on appeal.80
3. Pro-Prosecutorial Bias in the Justice System
Others argue that by prohibiting acquittal appeals, courts protect
defendants from pro-prosecutorial bias in the justice system.81 This
prohibition provides an indirect remedy to putative prosecutorial bias,
because it prohibits acquittal appeals, not pro-prosecutorial bias.
Some commentators point out that indirect remedies to prosecutorial
bias can be a precarious solution: "[D]ifferent types of bias may not
offset each other .... [P]ro-defendant distortions in the evolution
and application of legal standards do[] not necessarily negate or
counteract discrimination against defendants by decision makers in
the criminal justice system."8 2 Furthermore, a prohibition on acquit-
tal appeals may actually foment such favoritism rather than offset pro-
prosecutorial biases. Some commentators cite to compelling exam-
ples of pro-government bias clearly attributable to the perceived dis-
crimination against the state due to asymmetrical appeals.8 3 Direct
limits on prosecutorial power might better protect defendants and
more effectively serve the law. There is no dearth of scholarship pro-
posing direct remedies to pro-prosecutorial bias in the justice
system.8 4
Courts also defend asymmetrical appeals as counterbalancing the
effects of malicious or overzealous prosecution.85 Thus, in Lynch, a
78 Evan H. Caminker, Wh7y Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Predents?, 46 ST,%v.
L REv. 817, 827 n.40 (1994) (citing Paul L Colby, Two Iveus on the Legitinati of Nonacquies-
cence inJudiial Opinions, 61 TuL- L REv. 1041, 1051 (1987);Jonathan R. Macey. TheInternal
and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Dedrsi, 65 CHi.-KENr L Rv. 93, 111 (1989)); .me also
Miller, supra note 77, at 511 ("Some trial judges very frankly tell their prosecuting attome)s
that they do not propose to take any chances of being reversed by giving instructions favor-
ing the state on points disputed by counsel for the defendant.").
79 Andrew D. Leipold, ReldinkingJuyy Nullification, 82 VA. L REa. 253, 282 (1996).
80 Stith, supra note 9, at 5.
81 See, eg., OFFICE OF LEc-AL Poucy, supra note 9, at 891-92.
82 Stith, supra note 9, at 6; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 H,%v. L RE%.
700, 702-03 (1939) (criticizing indirect remedies in the contracts context).
83 Se; eg., Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 76, at 14-15.
84 See, eg., Vorenberg, supra note 62, at 1560-73 (proposing methods to increase
prosecutorial accountability and reduce prosecutorial leverage in plea bargaining).
85 See e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 171 (1873) (noting tie potential for abuse in
criminal prosecutions); OFFcIC OF LEcAL Poucv, supra note 9. at 891 (noting that "un-
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court of appeals judge observed: "[W] e would be oblivious if we were
not aware that [the defendants'] behavior was thus directed to one of
the most highly charged political and moral issues of our time,"''s im-
plying the Department of Justice inappropriately exercised its
prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors do enjoy a great degree of dis-
cretion in determining which suspects to pursue, deciding whether to
charge a defendant,8 7 and in negotiating plea bargains.s8
Opponents of this view can point to three criticisms. First,
prosecutorial discretion is normally an executive prerogative.8 1- Sec-
ond, prosecutors are least likely to overreach during the scrutiny of
appeal. Third, courts, voters, and others already directly police gross
prosecutorial overreaching.90 Thus, "[a] retrial may be subject to a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of selective or vindictive prosecu-
tion."91 The President has the power to remove abusive federal prose-
restricted government appeals of acquittals could lead to unjustified harassment of individ-
uals"); Amar, supra note 30, at 1834-35 (discussing how double jeopardy may inhibit
opportunities for prosecutorial vindictiveness). But see Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S.
141, 146 (1962) (ClarkJ, dissenting) ("[If there had been misconduct, the remedy would
have been to declare a mistrial and impose appropriate punishment upon the [prosecu.
tor], rather than upon the public."); Amar, supra note 30, at 1844 n.163 (discussing how
some currently unconstitutional acquittal appeals provide no greater opportunities for vex-
ation than other permitted procedures).
86 United States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330, 331 (2d Cir. 1999).
87 Vorenberg, supra note 62, at 1524 n.10 (citing studies which demonstrate "only a
minority of matters received by prosecutors result in charges").
88 See id. at 1523 (surveying and criticizing the broad scope of prosecutorial
discretion).
89 Prosecutorial discretion emerges from constitutional and prudential considera-
tions. On the constitutional side, separation of powers is especially significant. See United
States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1983); Neil B. Eisenstadt, Note, Let's Make a
Deak A Look at United States v. Dailey and Prosecutor-Witness Cooperation Agreements, 67 11.13.
L. REV. 749, 764-65 (1987). A congeries of prudential concerns also limits review:
[B]road discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the
strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Gov-
ernment's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Gov-
ernment's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind
of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in
this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining
the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill
law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmak-
ing to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by
revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All these are substantial
concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision
whether to prosecute.
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985).
90 Eisenstadt, supra note 89, at 764-65 ("Prosecutorial discretion, however, is not un-
limited. Courts balance the constitutional duty of prosecutors as members of the executive
branch with the judiciary's own responsibility for protecting individuals from abuses of
prosecutorial discretion that violate constitutional rights." (footnote omitted)).
91 DiBiagio, supra note 36, at 82 n.16.
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cutors from office, either directly or indirectly.9 2 State and local
prosecutors are often elected, and therefore subject to popular re-
straint. Recent legislation provides defendants with additional protec-
tions. For example, the Citizen Protection Act9 - subjects federal
prosecutors to the same rules of conduct as local attome)s. "[T]he
CPA [was] intended to regulate federal prosecutors more stringently
and to limit their powers."94 Competing political constituencies battle
over the limits of prosecutorial power, with some degree of success on
both sides. Judicial mediation of prosecutorial power via a prohibi-
tion on acquittal appeals may be neither appropriate or effective.
4. Nullification
More controversially, prohibiting appeals of legal issues following
acquittals insulates nullification from review.95 A decision maker nul-
lifies when she passes judgment on the basis of considerations other
than existing law. For example, when a juror votes to find a defen-
dant not guilty based on her personal sympathy for the defendant
rather than the weight of the evidence, that juror nullifies. Whether
nullification byjuries should be encouraged or stamped out is the sub-
ject of a controversial contemporary debate."" Pro-defendantjury nul-
lification is often defended by appeal to the Sixth Amendment.9 7 No
corollary constitutional provision can be invoked to defend the right
of a judge to nullify the law. Appeals are designed to prevent and
correctjudicial error.98 Particularly when the Doublejeopardy Clause
shelters self-conscious judicial lawlessness from appellate review, a
judge's intentional nullification raises serious ethical and constitu-
tional questions. 99
92 See 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994).
93 28 U.S.C. § 530B (Supp IV. 1998).
94 Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Posreutors, 88 GEo.
UJ. 207, 215 (2000).
95 See Alschuler, supra note 75, at 211-33; NancyJ. King, SilendngiNullifiration Adtoraq
Inside the Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. Cm. L REx,. 433, 436, 472 (1998);
Leipold, supra note 79, at 260-63.
96 See, e-g., King, supra note 95, at 433; Leipold, supra note 79, at 253; cf. Sir P.TRMC
DEVIN, TRIAL ByJURY 14 (1956) ("The jury ias in its origin as oracular as tie ordeal:
neither was conceived in reason: the verdict, no more than the result of the ordeal, ,-ns
open to rational criticism. This immunity has been largely retained ....").
97 Ajury trial nullification against the defendant is not protected by the S xth Amend-
ment. See, eg., Jackson N% Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10 (1979); Am. Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787 n.4 (1946); Ctu.u.Es AL%., Wtiur, 2A FEDum%. Pru.\cl-
AND PROCEDURE § 467, at 307 (3d ed. 2000). The deference of courts to te earthy wisdom
of the jury box is limited to determinations which favor defendants.
98 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
99 See, eg., Pamela S. Karlan, Two Coneepts ofJudidal Indipendlee, 72 S. C.u.. L RE%.
535, 556-57 (1999).
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a. Equal Protection
Professor Simson has argued thatjuror nullification is unconstitu-
tional because it violates equal protection, "since... jury nullification
would almost inevitably mean widely disparate treatment of persons
similarly situated in terms of the nature of their acts." 100 Professor
Simson's equal protection argument also applies to judicial nullifica-
tion. Consider the predicament of the defendant faced with a pro-
prosecutor judge.10' The judge, fearing an unappealable acquittal,
gives the government the benefit of the doubt. Compare this unfortu-
nate defendant with the defendant assigned a judge who finds being
overturned on appeal distasteful.' 0 2 Both are similarly situated, yet
the state, via its judicial agents, dispenses disparate treatment-dispa-
rate treatment fostered and insulated from correction by the estoppel
of government appeal.
b. The Duty to Follow Precedent
Judges who nullify breach their duty to follow the law. One prac-
tice manual observes as axiomatic that "in a hierarchical system of
courts, the duty of a subordinate court to follow the laws as an-
nounced by superior courts is theoretically absolute."10 3 Although
this precept has not gone unquestioned, it stands on firm footing.'"'
By analogy, consider the duty of jurors to uphold the law. 1'05
Ajury has no more "right to find a "guilty" defendant "not guilty"
than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant guilty, and the fact that
the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be,
does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such
verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exer-
cise of erroneously seized power.' 0 6
Surely ajudge has no more right to nullify than ajuror. If ajudge has
no right to ignore the law, nullification oversteps the bounds of power
granted her under Article III.
100 GaryJ. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical Vie, 54 Ttx. L.
REv. 488, 518 (1976).
101 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
102 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
103 lB JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrncE 0.401 (2d ed. 1993);
Caminker, supra note 78, at 818 n.2.
104 See Caminker, supra note 78, at 872-73.
105 Thomas v. United States, 116 F.3d 606, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1997).
106 United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983), quoted in Thomas,
116 F.3d at 615-16; see Simson, supra note 100, at 524 & n.156.
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c. Ethical Considerations
Under the ABA Model Code ofJudicial Conduct, judges have an ethi-
cal obligation to "respect and comply with the law."' 07 Although the
Model Code is not designed as a basis for criminal or civil liability, viola-
tions of the rules should often trigger disciplinary action.'" By defini-
tion, judges who nullify fail to comply with the law.' 09 Federal judges
take an oath of office to "faithfully and impartially discharge and per-
form all the duties [of ajudge] under the Constitution and laws of the
United States."110 Nullification violates this oath. Insulating the prod-
uct of such unethical judicial behavior from review would seem to
compound the original wrong.
d. Civil Disobedience
Judge Posner has defended judicial nullification as a form of civil
disobedience:
Ifjudges are carefully selected, as is generally true of federal judges,
ajudge's civil disobedience-his refusal to enforce a law "as written"
because it violates his deepest moral feelings-is a significant da-
tum. It is a portent of a possible revolt by the elite, which is the sort
of thing that ought to give the political authorities pause.'
107 MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDLUcr canon 2 (1990); id. canon 1 cant.
108 Id. pmbl.; cf. Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods ofJudidalDispli, 142 U. Ph.
L REv. 243 (1993) (evaluating quasi-disciplinary mechanisms forjudicial misconduct); Pe-
ter M. Shane, 117w May Discpline or Ranove FderaltJudges? A Constifulional Anatysis, 142 U.
PA. L. REv. 209 (1993) (examining the separation-of-powers implications of judicial
discipline).
109 See MOORE Er AL., supra note 103, 0.401 ("As applied in a hierarchical system of
courts, the duty of a subordinate court to follow the laws as announced by superior courts
is theoretically absolute."); see also Caminker, supra note 78, at 873 (concluding "hierarchi-
cal precedent is sensible and, in the main, persuasively justified").
110 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1994); Thomas, 116 F.3d at 616.
111 Richard A. Posner, The Problens of Moral and Legal 77iearo' 111 H.w. L R%-. 1637,
1708 (1998). But cf. Caminker, supra note 78, at 860-65 (rejecting the argument that lower
courts may decline to follow precedent to stimulate reform). Judge Posner's stance on
agency nullification (or "nonacquiescence") is less easygoing. See, e.g., Nielsen Litho-
graphing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 1988) (criticizing failure of indepen-
dent agency to provide rationale for nonacquiescence as "disingenuous, easive, and in
short dishonest"). In fairness, the subject of Posner's ire in Nis m is an independent
agency refusing to follow the judicial branch. In the block quote above,Judge Posner de-
fends ajudicial refusal to heed the legislature. The separation-of-powers balances for the
two situations may be quite different, given the dramatic differences in power between the
branches. Cf Samuel Estreicher & Richard L Revesz, Nonacquiescence b, Federal Administra-
tive Agencies, 98 YALE L1. 679, 723-32 (1989) (exploring separation of powers issues impli-
cated by agency nonacquiescence).
The distribution of power between the branches is uneven. Alexander Hamilton, in a
discussion which touches on judicial nullification, points out the varying powers of the
branches in relation to each other. Thejudicial power is, by design, a weaker, dependent
power. Ti FERAusr No. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
("[The judiciary] may truly be said to have neither roncE nor wiLL but merelyjudgment;
and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm for the efficacious exercise
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But it is one thing for a judge's nullification to be a "significant da-
tum" that gives "pause" to the "political authorities." It is quite an-
other to fortify nullification against any review. "[T] he damage to our
judicial system is exponentially greater when a judge, in whom the
Constitution entrusts the power 'to say what the law is,' ... engag[es]
in the very same lawless usurpation of power that he is bound to do his
utmost to prevent." 1 2 At the very least, permitting review in such
cases would provide a forum in which to explore and debate the pro-
priety of judicial nullification.
The issue is complicated by sympathetic instances of "benevolent"
nullification. For example, in the nineteenth centuryjuries acquitted
defendants prosecuted under the fugitive slave laws. n 3 But, as a Sec-
ond Circuitjudge recently observed, "more recent history presents nu-
merous and notorious examples of jurors nullifying," giving as
illustrations "shameful examples of how nullification has been used to
sanction murder and lynching."114
Ajudge's duties include a "duty to forestall or prevent Uuror nul-
lification]."" 5 Just as a juror should be dismissed if she threatens to
nullify,116 surely ajudge who finds herself unable to apply the law in
good conscience should recuse herself. 1" 7 By statute, a federal judge
should recuse himself "in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might be questioned."'"8
even of this faculty."). Hamilton downplays any danger from the weakest branch: "[The
weakness of the judiciary] equally proves, that, though individual oppression may now and
then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be
endangered from that quarter .... ." Id. Because the judiciary is dependent, a failure of
the other branches to follow its judgments may be more deserving of clamorous protest.
The very weakness of the judiciary may vindicate any judicial stance, even an unconstitt-
tional one, against the might of the executive or legislative branches.
Judge Posner himself has rarely provided the significant datum he discusses in the text
above, at least regarding the judicial rather than the legislative will-he has been punctili-
ous in following precedent, even where he vociferously disagrees with it. See, e.g., K1thin v.
State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[Albrecht) should be overruled. Some-
day, we expect, it ill be .... We have been told by our judicial superiors not to read the
sibylline leaves of the U.S. Reports for prophetic clues to overruling. It is not our place to
overrule Albrecht. . . ."). Of course, precedent comes from the judicial branch, from the
same branch-in the quote in the text above judge Posner is defending judicial nullifica-
tion of the legislative branch.
112 United States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330, 338 (2d Cir. 1999) (Cabranes,J., dissenting)
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
113 See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing to a number
of such instances).
14 Id. at 617.
115 Id. at 616.
116 Id. at 616-17.
117 See, e.g., John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MAlR.,
L. REv. 303, 303-04, 331-33 (1998) (arguing judges should recuse themselves when they
cannot in good conscience follow the law); cf. Richard B. Saphire, Religion and Recusal, 81
MARQ. L. Rev. 351 (1998) (critiquing same).
118 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
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Acquittal appeals stand at the interstices of a variety of concerns.
The Constitution endures as the humble defendant's champion
against a plenipotentiary prosecutor. Law ought not to oppress the
innocent. Conversely, "justice, though due to the accused, is due to
the accuser also."" 9 Thus, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, Justice Cardozo
held that the prosecutor's interest injustice goes so far as to counter-
balance "[p]rivileges [of an accused] so fundamental as to be inher-
ent in every concept of a fair trial."12 0
This Note provides only a brief, and prejudiced, survey of some of
the factors in favor of permitting judicial review of legal issues follow-
ing acquittal. Most determinative is that the Court has spoken quite
favorably regarding acquittal appeals of purely legal issues. 12,' That
approval was in dicta, but the Court cannot voice anything but dicta
until squarely confronted with the controversy. Since the Court de-
cided Jenkins and Wilson, only two circuits confronted an appeal of an
acquittal which would require no further fact-finding.1L' The circuit
most recently confronted with such an appeal refused jurisdiction.
This Note turns now to that controversy.
C. United States v. Lynch
In a recent Second Circuit case, United States v. Lynchi,123 the De-
partment of Justice's attempt to appeal an acquittal on a purely legal
issue culminated in an evenly split en banc circuit. -124 A majority of
the initial court of appeals panel justified its refusal to hear the case in
119 Snyder v. 1afssachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (Cardozo, J.).
120 Id
121 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
122 My research has uncovered only three acquittal appeal cases other than Lynudh
where no further fact-finding was facially necessary. See United States v. Fa)er, 573 F.2d 741
(2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Dyer, 546 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Certi-
fled Grocers Co-op, 546 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir. 1976).
All except Dyer are distinguishable, and Dy'er and GCrtfid Grate, although penned by
the same judge, appear inconsistent. For further discussion of Derand Certified Groaer, see
infra note 172. In Fayerfact-sifting was not possible "in light of the judge's other findings
and statements which explicitly contradict such an implicit reading of the findings." Fayer,
573 F.2d at 664. The court felt constrained "to conclude that findings 'against the defen-
dant on all issues necessary to establish guilt' as required byJenkins are not at all 'clear.'
Rather, on a remand, additional findings of fact would have to be made .... " Id.
Panels on the Tenth Circuit and the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals recently
cited Lyndi regarding appeals of acquittals. See United States v. Hunt. 212 F.3d 539, 544
(10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Adams, 52 M.J. 836,838 (A.F. CL Crim. App. 2000). Both
cases would have required further fact-finding, however. In Hind, the district court failed
to make factual findings which would have been sufficient to prove the defendants' guilt.
Hunt, 212 F.3d at 549-50 & n.6. As the court put it: "[T]here are no factual findings for us
to reinstate on appeal were we to reverse the district court on the merits. Instead, we would
have to remand for farther fact-finding proceedings." Id. at 550.
123 162 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998), rdiT'g en banc denid, 181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999).
124 Lynch, 181 F.3d at 330-31.
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the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 25 Half of the en banc circuit voted in
favor of a rehearing, 126 failing the required majority by a single
vote. 127
In the underlying case, two antiabortion protesters were charged
with violating a court order by blocking access to a medical clinic.
Their crime was an act of civil disobedience.' 28 In the bench trial,
Judge Sprizzo, the district courtjudge, refused to find contempt, hold-
ing that the defendants were not "willful" because they were acting
without any "bad" intent, but according to heartfelt religious feel-
ing.' 29 Everyjudge who reviewed this definition of willfulness agreed
that Judge Sprizzo erred.' 30 A number of commentators have cited
Judge Sprizzo's Lynch decision as an example of judicial
nullification.' 3 '
Despite the unanimous view that Judge Sprizzo erred, the panel
majority refused jurisdiction because they accepted Judge Sprizzo's
characterization of his finding of no willfulness as a factual judgment.
Factual determinations which lead to acquittal are immune under the
Double Jeopardy Clause from further review on appeal.' 32 As the
panel majority noted, "[i]t does not matter that this factual finding
was arrived at under the influence of an erroneous view of the law."'1'
The court extended this double jeopardy protection of findings of fact
to bench trials.' 34
125 Id.
126 See id.
127 "The Second Circuit's refusal ... was a close decision: ... Judge Feinberg... [whol
almost certainly would have voted for rehearing en banc[ ] was precluded from casting a
vote due to his senior status." Comment, United States v. Lynch, 181 E3d 330 (2d Cir.
1999), 113 HARv. L. REv. 1252, 1252 n.4 (2000); see Lynch, 181 F.3d at 333 & n.1 (Cabranes,
J., dissenting).
128 Synopses of the case are available. See, e.g., Mark F_ Kravitz, Developments in the Sec-
ond Circuit: 1998-99, 32 CONN. L. REy. 949, 987-91 (2000); Comment, supra note 127, at
1252-53.
129 See United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
130 See Lynch, 181 F.3d at 332 (Sack, J., concurring); Lynch, 162 F.3d at 735; id. at 747
(Feinberg, J., dissenting).
131 See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Lau, of lnconsitent
Verdicts, 111 -IHAv. L. Rm. 771, 802 n.159 (1998);Jack B. Sarno, Note, A Natural Law De-
fense ofBuckley v. Valeo, 66 FoRntam L. Ray. 2693, 2725-26 n.246 (1998).
132 Lynch, 162 F.3d at 735-36; see Lynch, 181 F.3d at 330 (Sack, J., concurring).
133 Lynch, 162 F.3d at 735.
134 See id. at 736. Note that both the majority and concurrence suggest double jeop-
ardy protection of a finding of fact in a bench trial is not necessarily inherent to the Consti-
tution. See id. (majority opinion); id. (Sack, J., concurring). This suggests the right to a
trial by jury is a more accurate justification for a prohibition on post-acquittal appeals of
factual issues. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 30, at 1843, 1846. Cf THoNL's, supra note 31, at
259 ("JJ]ury nullification ... is logically located in the right to ajury trial. No particular
reason exists to call this a double jeopardy protection.").
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All of the judges who confronted the question agreed that the
Clause does not protect purely legal errors. t35 Appellate jurisdiction
thus turned on whether the district court would have to make addi-
tional findings of fact on remand. According to the panel majority
and concurrence, additional findings of fact would have been neces-
sary,13 6 so the court found the Lynch appeal beyond its purview. ta7
The dissent maintained that an appeal would involve no retrial of
factual issues. 138 Under dicta in Supreme Court cases,' 3 9
it may be possible upon sifting [the] findings [of fact in a bench
trial] to determine that the court's finding of "not guilty" is attribu-
table to an erroneous conception of the law whereas the court has
resolved against the defendant all of the factual issues necessary to
support a finding of guilt under the correct legal standard. 140
By "sifting" the trial record and bench findings for the "implied" find-
ings of fact, an appellate court may be able to discern the findings of
fact the trial court reached but, because of legal error, failed to ap-
ply.'41 Using this approach, the dissent sifted the district court's find-
ing of facts, determining the defendants acted willfully. 14"2 The dissent
sifted the findings by excising the legal error from the preexisting fac-
tual determination.'43 By protecting the original finding of facts, sift-
ing circumvents any possibility of subjecting the defendants to further
fact-finder scrutiny. By avoiding further fact-finding, sifting permits
135 See Lynch, 162 F.3d at 738-39 (SackJ., concurring); id. at 740-41 (Feinberg,J., dis-
senting); see also OmcCE oF LEsc ,L Poucv, supra note 9, at 895 ("We believe that the Depart-
ment would stand an excellent chance of obtaining sanction for government appeals of
errors of law in a bench trial, when findings of fact clearly support a guilty verdict."); supra
note 43 and accompanying text (citing cases that support prosecutorial appeals when Elhe
error is purely legal).
136 Lynch, 162 F.3d 734-35; id. at 740 (Sack, J., concurring). Because the majority ac-
cepted the trial court's characterization of its determination of willfulness as a finding of
fact, any alteration of that determination would necessarily require further fact-finding.
d; cf. infra note 146 (impugning the propriety of appellate courts accepting trial court
characterizations of inquiries as legal or factual).
137 Lynch, 162 F.3d at 736.
138 Id at 740-41 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
139 See, &g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1977);
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975), oremled by) United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 (1975); Omcm or L. u% Poucy,
supra note 9, at 894 n.260 (citing Martin Linen, Jentdns, and ll7/son).
140 Lynch, 162 F.3d at 743 (Feinberg, J., dissenting) (quotingJenins, 420 U.S. at 366-
67).
141 See id at 74445 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). For further discussion of fact-sifting, see
infra note 172 and accompanying text.
142 See i& (Feinberg, J., dissenting)
143 See id. at 746 ("In sum, the district court impliedly found the element of willfulness
against Lynch and Moscinski and in favor of the prosecution. Since all four elements of
criminal contempt were thus resolved against the defendants, no further factfinding would
be necessary on remand.").
2001] 1151
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
an appellate court to exercise jurisdiction without affronting the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
The Lynch dissent accepted the double jeopardy restraint prohib-
iting appeals which would entail further fact-finding t 4 However, the
dissent would narrow the meaning of "further fact-finding" to exclude
appellate "fact-sifting. ' 145 Thus, when appellate courts can compart-
mentalize bench legal error, they may apply appellate determinations
of law to the record to resuscitate the findings of fact. Although the
government would not gain an opportunity to twice present its case to
a fact-finder, the prosecution could appeal legal error.
No member of the Lynch panel confronted whether the district
judge's "finding of fact" was a finding of fact, a finding of law, or an
application of law to fact. The panel majority accepted the district
court's characterization of its willfulness determination as factual. But
"[t]he trial court's decision as to whether an issue is one of fact or one
of law is itself reviewed as a question of law."'1 46 Whether Judge
Sprizzo's finding was one of fact or law was an issue for the court of
appeals to determine de novo. Under Wilson and Jenkins, to deter-
mine whether jurisdiction is available, the court must ascertain if any
legal "error could be corrected without subjecting [the defendant] to
a second trial before a second trier of fact."147 But, of the five opin-
ions148 written regarding the Lynch appeal, none confront the concep-
tual difficulty of discerning the difference between a finding of fact
and a finding of law.' 49 Yet the original panel was split, and half the
144 Id. (Feinberg, J., dissenting)
145 See id. (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
146 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, 2 FEDERAL STANDARDS OF RILAw
§ 11.28, at 11-115 to 11-116 (3d ed. 1999) (in the context of submission of issues to ajury);
see also Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CAL. L.
REv. 1020, 1021 & n.11 (1967) (citing to civil cases where "'true nature' of trial judge's
holdings [was] 'not determined by their labels'" (quoting Benrose Fabrics Corp. v. Rosen-
stein, 183 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1950))).
147 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 (1975); see also United States v. Jenkins,
420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975) (describing the Wilson rule), overruled by United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82 (1978). "The question of jurisdiction, under the standard set forth in United
States v. Jenkins, is intertwined with the merits." United States v. Certified Grocers Co-op,
546 F.2d 1308, 1309 (7th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted). For further discussion of Certified
Grocers, see infra note 172.
148 United States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330, 330 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sacks, J., concurring); id.
at 332 (Cabranes,J., with whomJudges Parker, Pooler, and Sotomayer concurred, and with
whomJudge Leval concurred in part, dissenting); Lynch, 162 F.3d at 733 (Jacobs,J.) (panel
majority); id. at 736 (Sacks, J., concurring); id. at 740 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
149 Cf. Lynch, 181 F.3d at 336-37 & n.10 (Cabranes,J., dissenting) (asserting the district
court's findings of fact should be "considered in conjunction with its conclusions of law"
and suggesting "[t]he en banc court might have considered whether the district court
designated its decision as a 'factual' determination in an effort to insulate the acquittal
from appeal"); Lynch, 162 F.3d at 735 (asserting, in its cursory discussion of the law.Itact
distinction: "the district court's error of law influenced its finding as to wilfulness and is
integral to that element; it cannot be deemed.., to be an additional, distinct, and severt-
1152 [Vol. 86:1131
2001] DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1153
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was cominced an en banc rehearing
was appropriate,' 50 presumably based on precisely this distinction.Y
This Note has argued that appeals of legal issues in acquittals are
constitutional and well-advised. In Lynch, Second Circuit judges
agreed acquittal appeals of legal issues are permitted, but were split
on the mechanics. This Note now explores those mechanics.
II
THE LAW-FACT DIsTINCrION AND DouBLE JEOPARDY
Augmenting the analysis of double jeopardy with an understand-
ing of the law-fact distinction, fact-sifting quickly turns out to be a rou-
tine appellate tool. Law-fact distinction jurisprudence invites an
expansive view of appellate review of acquittals.
A. The Law-Fact Distinction
Appellate courts have traditionally focused on the law-fact distinc-
tion in determining the reviewability of trial-level determinations. 1
Because appellate scope of review depends on an appellate court's
classification of a decision as legal or factual, "appellate courts poten-
tially exercise considerable power over the ultimate fact-findings of
trial level decision makers."1513 Like double jeopardy law, tie princi-
ples demarcating questions of fact from questions of law are murky'
ble element"); CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 146, § 11.28 (asserting the trial court's reso-
lution of law-fact distinction is subject to de novo appellate review as a legal question).
150 Lynch, 181 F.3d at 333 (CabranesJ., dissenting).
151 The majority en banc decision is terse. Presumably, the majority accepts Jenkins
and Wilson, but rejects their applicability in this context-although they may, of course,
have had independent reasons for not wishing to revisit the Lyndh case en bane. Cf Ltneh,
162 F.3d at 740 n.4 (Sacks, J., concurring) (asserting "we write on the assumption that
Jenkins] is good law").
152 See, e.g., Martin B. Louis, AllocatingAdjudicathe Dcision Mahing Authority Betu'en the
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified Irew of the Scope of Review the JudgelJa Question, and
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L Rv,. 993, 993 (1986) (asserting, in tie civil context, that
review of errors "is popularly governed by the familiar distinction between fact and law);
Weiner, supra note 146, at 1021 (discussing standards of review in the cil context).
153 Louis, supra note 152, at 997.
154 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Suint, 456
U.S. 273, 288 (1982); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944); CHuLDRss &
DAVIs, supra note 146, § 7.05; George C. Christie, Judicial PRvine of Findings of Fact, 87 Nw.
U. L REv. 14, 14-15 (1992); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact RhiaL, 85 COLtv t. L
Rxv. 229, 232 (1985); cf. Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Lwm-Fact Distindion,
54 CA.- L. RE'. 1867 (1966) (discussing the law-fact distinction in the civil context).
Following the Supreme Court, this Note distinguishes ciil fact-finding from criminal
fact-finding. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 517 (1995); Colleen P. Murphy,
Context and the Allocation ofDecisioninaking: Rejslions on United States v. Gaudin, 82 VA'. L
REv. 961, 963 (1996). But see id. at 964, 972-75 (asserting the Court has 'overstat(ed] the
dvil/criminal dichotomy").
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and ancient.155 Despite the "elusive" 156 character of a technique for
distinguishing fact from law, consistent criteria are discernable.1 7
Generally, a court must make two interrelated determinations to
distinguish between fact and law. First, the court must classify the pu-
tative error as purely factual, purely legal, or an application of law to
fact. 58 The second, corollary determination, and the fuzzy part of the
test, is whether the appellate court owes deference to the trial court's
determination regardless of the analytic classification of the error as
one of law or application of law to fact.
B. Law and Fact Analytically
Broadly speaking, a determination of law possesses a universal
quality-legal principles have general normative and prescriptive sig-
nificance. Determinations of law are abstract, permitting application
to diverse patterns of conduct.159 For example, as a matter of pure
law, "wilfulness" is generally defined as acting while "aware [one's]
conduct is of the required nature."160 Thus, persons who act while
aware their conduct violates a court order act with "wilfulness."' 61
Factual determinations, on the other hand, are specific assess-
ments of what actually occurred, in a historical or scientific sense. 1432
"[Factual] assertions . . . generally respond to inquiries about who,
when, what, and where-inquiries that can be made 'by a person who
is ignorant of the applicable law.""163 For example, the parties in the
155 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CGu. L. Rv. 1175, 1176
(1989) (citing Aristotle).
156 Miller, 474 U.S. at 113.
157 Cf Christie, supra note 154, at 14. Professor Christie observes:
It seems as if no term goes by without a violent disagreement among the
members of the Court over whether some trial court determination is a
question of law or a mixed question of law and fact, and thus open for re-
examination, or a question of fact, whose re-examination is thus foreclosed.
Id.
158 Cf Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal
Juries, 61 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 723, 729-33 (1993) (proposing five analytic categories, rather
than the traditional three).
159 See Monaghan, supra note 154, at 235; Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact orJustice?,
66 B.U. L. Rxv. 487, 487 (1986); cf Weiner, supra note 154, at 1868-69 (discussing ques-
tions of law in similar terms in the civil context).
160 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 2 (1985). The Model Penal Code equates willful-
ness with acting knowingly. Id. § 2.02(8).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Wilfulness
merely requires 'a specific intent to consciously disregard an order of the court.'") (quot-
ing United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 837 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Ber-
ardelli, 565 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1977))), reh'gen banc denied, 181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999).
162 See Monaghan, supra note 154, at 235-36; Zuckerman, supra note 159, at 487; cf,
Weiner, supra note 154, at 1869-71 (discussing questions of fact in similar terms in the civil
context).
163 Monaghan, supra note 154, at 235 (quoting Louis JAFFE, JUDICAL CO-rroL oF AD-
MINISTnATvE AcnoN 548 (1965)). Such determinations include assessments of an actor's
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Lynch case stipulated that "at approximately 7:50 a.m. a police officer
informed the defendants that 'they were in violation of the law and
that if they did not leave the area immediately they would be arrested.'
The defendants 'acknowledged the warning and refused to leave.'"""
This stipulation was an agreement between the parties regarding facts.
Findings of fact often involve discretion; they are cases which "could
go either way."' 65 Despite this seeming clarity the nodes of fact and
law are not necessarily distinct; they may blur together 66
The application of law to fact is a third category.167 A decision
maker applies law to fact when she assesses whether the general legal
principle is applicable to the specific facts. Application of law to facts
entails a judgment that this law is relevant to these facts, or stated con-
versely, that the facts, by meeting the standard instantiated in the law,
trigger legal consequences."' s Although the application Qf law to fact
may represent an analytically distinct category, applications of law to
fact are classified as either legal or factual for purposes of allocating
primary decision-making responsibility.' 69
In the district court's published opinion in Lynch, Judge Sprizzo
stated: "[T]he Court finds as a matter of fact that Lynch's and Moscin-
ski's sincere, genuine, objectively based and, indeed, conscience-
driven religious belief, precludes a finding of willfulness." 70 From a
purely analytic perspective, Judge Sprizzo's statement smacks of the
general applicability that characterizes findings of law. The principle
expressed, while clearly erroneous,17' is a simple axiom: Willfulness
objective mental state. Cf. Weiner, supra note 154, at 1870-71 (discussing mental state in
the civil context).
164 Lynck 162 F.3d at 742 n.1 (quoting fromjudge Sprizzo's injunction).
165 Scalia, supra note 155, at 1181; see also Zuckerman, supra note 159, at 493 & n.21
(recognizing that decisions of fact are those that "warrant determination either way').
166 For example, consider Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 501 n.17 (1984). Here the Court explained-
A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles through
which it was deduced. At some point, the reasoning by which a fact is
"found" crosses the line between application of those ordinary principles of
logic and common experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the finder
of fact into the realm of a legal rule upon which the reviewing court must
exercise its own independentjudgment. Where the line is dran vanries ac-
cording to the nature of the substantive law at issue.
Id. at 501 n.17; see also Scalia, supra note 155, at 1187-88 (comparing Justice Holmes in
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), andJustice Cardozo in Pc!ora .
Wabash Railway, 292 U.S. 98 (1934), to illustrate how difficult it is to draw the line between
fact and law).
167 See Monaghan, supra note 154, at 236-38; cf Weiner, supra note 154, at 1874-76
(discussing the application of law to fact in the'civil context).
168 See Monaghan, supra note 154, at 236.
169 SeeLouis, supra note 152, at 998, 1002. There is no intermediary level of review. See
id. at 1002.
170 United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
171 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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does not include conscience-driven motivation. Judge Sprizzo's state-
ment is both a finding of law (crimes motivated by conscience are not
willful) and an application of this novel legal principle to the facts of
the case at bar (Lynch and Moscinski were motivated by conscience
and therefore did not act willfully). While the statement includes fac-
tual determinations regarding the defendants' state of mind (they
were "sincere," etc.), these factual determinations, however accurate,
are irrelevant to an application of the correct law to the facts.
The sifting of these findings of fact from the incorrect finding of
law, and the application of the correct law to facts is elementary.1 72
Analytically, the district court's "finding of fact" is a conjoined finding
of law and application of law to fact. Given the correct law, the fact
that Lynch and Moscinski were sincere is completely irrelevant. Ignor-
ing such irrelevant facts requires no further fact-finding. Nor would
further fact-finding be required if Judge Sprizzo's standard was cor-
rect-the appeals court could simply affirm the acquittal. So, accord-
ing to ordinary definitions of law and fact, no further fact-finding was
needed to correct Judge Sprizzo's error.
172 Thus, an appellate court sifts facts when it takes facts previously determined by an
underlying decision maker, and applies the appropriate law to those facts. See, e.g., United
States v.Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1975), overruled by United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82
(1987). For discussion of American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), a Su-
preme Court case which explicitly condones thus-defined fact sifting, see inJra notes 191-92
and accompanying text.
For another case attempting fact-sifting, see United States v. Certified Grocers Co-op, 546
F.2d 1308, 1313 (7th Cir. 1976) (ToneJ.) (dicta), in which the court of appeals attempted
to sift the facts following a bench trial. Citing Jenkins, the court of appeals contemplated
making an inference as a matter of law based on the trial court's fact-finding. See id. at
1312-13; cf. Zuckerman, supra note 159, at 493 (observing "questions admitting of only one
answer are [often) characterized as questions of law"). However, on the available record,
the appeals court determined the findings were too sparse to permit such a ruling. See
Certfied Grocers, 546 F.2d at 1313. Judge Tone's dicta in Certified Grocers is obfuscated by his
opinion in a case decided the same day, United States v. Dyer, 546 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1976),
which appears irreconcilable with the former:
While a rational mind could hardly conclude [the defendant was not guilty
of an essential element of the crime under the law as proposed by the Gov-
ernment on appeal], no finding was made on the point. It is for the trier of
fact to draw the inferences, however obvious, and we have no power to do
SO.
Id. at 1316. Like in Certified Grocers, the trial findings were the product of a bench trial. See
id. at 1314. If "a rational mind could hardly conclude" otherwise, it is difficult to imagine
why a finding of law would not be permitted under Jenkins and Certified Grocers. Cf Scalia,
supra note 155, at 1181 (citing civil cases for the proposition that extreme factual determi-
nations become questions of law); Weiner, supra note 146, at 1021 (asserting, in the civil
bench trial context, "a 'factual' finding by the trial judge may be reversed as a 'legal' error
if not supported by substantial evidence"); Zuckerman, supra note 159, at 493 ("'All these
cases in which the facts warrant a determination either way can be described as questions
of degree and, therefore, as questions of fact.'" (citation omitted)).
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C. Law and Fact Synthetically
Ascertaining whether an inquiry is analytically "factual" or "legal"
is not necessarily determinative. 73 The determination also involves
practical considerations regarding the allocation of decision making
which often supersede analytic classification.' 7 -1 As set forth in Miller
v. Fenton:
At least in those instances in which Congress has not spoken and in
which the issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard
and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has
turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound adminis-
tration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than an-
other to decide the issue in question.173
This inquiry is the second prong of the intertwined law-fact test:
Should the trial court's determination be accorded deference on ap-
peal? Thus, disconcertingly, an inquiry may be factual in one context,
and legal in another. 76 This pragmatic allocative inquiry is especially
pertinent in determining which decision maker should apply law to
fact. 17 7
173 Because the standard of appellate review is split between law and fact, ith no third
category, I will only refer to these two categories in general discussions. &eZsupra note 169
and accompanying text.
174 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14, 116 (1985) ("putting to one side whether
'voluntariness' is analytically more akin to a fact or legal conclusion"); Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1974); CtnuiRzss & D.As,
supra note 146, § 7.03, at 7-26; Monaghan, supra note 154, at 237 ('The real issue is not
analytic, but allocative: what decisionmaker should decide the issuer"); cf Weiner, supra
note 154, at 1868 (asserting, in the civil context, that "a question of law or a question of
fact is a mere synonym for a judge question or a jury question"). But see Murphy, supra
note 154, at 963-64 (arguing against contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence, that
.context is too easily employed as a substitute for analysis").
175 Afilkr, 474 U.S. at 114; see also Monaghan, supra note 154, at 234 (allocation deter-
mined by "appropriateness").
176 See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 520-22 (1995); Weidner v. Thiere, 866
F.2d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) ("It is nowhere written that the law-fact distinc-
tion must be treated the same in 18 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and in Fed.RICiv.P. 52(a)."); cf Mur-
phy, supra note 154, at 971-72 (criticizing this confusing state).
177 See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522; Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 29-5, 231-32
(1991); Monaghan, supra note 154, at 237; cf. Louis, supra note 152, at 1000 (asserting, in
the civil context, that "[tihe law/fact dichotomy does quite well in predicting how appel-
late courts will review trial level determinations of 'pure' law and 'pure' or historical fact").
Justice Holmes was in favor of broader appellate review, he accordingly defined determina-
tions of law broadly. See Balt. & Ohio R.R1 v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927); O.W.
HOLmES, JR., THE CO.MM\ON LmW 120-24 (1881); Louis, supra note 152, at 1021-22; Scalia,
supra note 155, at 1187-88. Expressing a similar sentiment, Justice O'Connor noted that
"hybrid" inquiries, "subsuming... a 'complex of values,'" ought not to be treated as inquir-
ies of "simple historical fact." Miller, 474 U.S. at 116 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama. 361
U.S. 199, 207 (1960)). But compare Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512 (Scalia, J.) (noting that the
application of law to fact is generally a task for the jury), and Weiner, supra note 154, at
1919-21 (asserting the right to ajury trial generally provides for the jury to apply law to fact
in the civil context), with Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 525-26 (Rehnquist,J., concurring) (citing a
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Although the synthetic analysis is even more flexible than the an-
alytic inquiry, there are a few touchstones which guide courts in mak-
ing this determination.
1. The Constitution
The Constitution most heavily influences the allocation of deci-
sion-making responsibility, and thus affects the classification of inquir-
ies as factual or legal.178 Under the constitutional fact doctrine t'7
determinations implicating constitutional rights become legal inquir-
ies in order to permit Supreme Court review. 180 In First Amendment
cases, appellate judges have a duty to review lower court application of
law to fact.' 8 ' This duty "reflects a deeply held conviction that
number of application of law to fact inquiries which "remain the proper domain of the
trial court").
Professor Martin Louis has argued that the current legal climate favors categorizing
application of law to fact as factual determinations. Louis, supra note 152, at 1003-04, 1007.
He explains this bias through judicial economy. Given contemporary caseloads, appellate
courts simply do not have the time to act as supplementary decision makers. See id. at 998,
1006, 1013 & nn.140-43. By classifying inquiries as purely factual, appellate courts limit
their own capacity to review trial decisions. See id. at 1006. When deferring to trial courts'
factual determinations, appellate courts lighten their own responsibilities. See id. Defer-
ring to trial decision makers may also result in less conservative determinations. See id, at
1022.
178 Where the allocation equation involves ajury, the Sixth Amendment exerts a pow-
erful influence. See, e.g., Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522; Murphy, supra note 154, at 969; see also
supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing nullification). But see Leipold, supra
note 79, at 284-96 (arguing the Constitution does not protect nullification).
In a bench trial, however, allocations of decision making justified via the Sixth Amend-
mentjury right become far less compelling. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 394-95 (1948); cf Louis, supra note 152, at 994 (asserting that "traditionally the degree
of deference has varied slightly depending on whether the factual findings were made by a
jury, an agency, or a trial judge"). But see Christie, supra note 154, at 16-17 (asserting that
deference accorded to juries has often been extended to trial judges); Louis, supra note
152, at 998, 1002 (arguing that the distinction in deference between juries and judges is
eroding).
Neither do bench judgments share the historical lineage ofjury determinations, For
example, the roots of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, permitting directed verdicts
of acquittal, were innovations of the latter half of the nineteenth century. See Theodore W.
Phillips, Note, The Motion for Acquittal: A Neglected Safeguard, 70 YALE L.J. 1151, 1152 & n.8
(1961). These innovations "developed as a corollary to the directed verdict in civil cases,
with little apparent thought or reasoning." Richard Sauber & Michael Waldman, Unlimited
Power: Rule 29(a) and the Unreviewability of Directed Judgments of Acquittal, 44 Ai. U, L, av.
433, 434 (1994); see also id. at 439 & n.30, 440-41 (discussing the history ofjudgments of
acquittal).
179 The Supreme Court appears to be moving toward a more candid acceptance of the
doctrine. See, e.g., Miller, 474 U.S. at 117; Scalia, supra note 155, at 1182. But see Monaghan,
supra note 154, at 231 n.17 (suggesting the Court may be wary of openly adopting the
doctrine).
180 See Monaghan, supra note 154, at 230-31.
181 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514
(1984); cf Monaghan, supra note 154, at 229 (characterizing the Court's direction to
courts of appeals as an imperative and criticizing the imposition of such an obligation).
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judges-and particularly Members of this Court-must exercise such
review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and or-
dained by the Constitution."18 2
The Court determines the minimum constitutional decencies.
Yet, as the court of last resort, the Court must also determine the
outer limits of constitutional protections.18 3 When one party is sys-
tematically denied review of unfavorable determinations, substantive
law may be distorted.184 Commenting on proposed amendments to
the Criminal Appeals Act which were later enacted, Will Wilson, Assis-
tant Attorney General in 1970, argued in favor of the revisions be-
cause they would permit review of constitutional errors masquerading
as acquittals. 85
2. Stare Decisis
When no constitutional interests compete, a primary considera-
tion in determining whether an inquiry is one of law or fact is a matter
of stare decisis.' 86 When appellate courts have traditionally exercised
review, or when a particular sort of inquiry has traditionally been clas-
sified as one of fact or law, precedent counsels in favor of consistent
classification. 187
But precedent runs counter to the Lynch ruling. A long line of
Second Circuit civil cases has held that the application of law to fact is
a legal inquiry.188 Thus, in Karavos Conpania Naviera S.A. v. Atlantica
182 Bose, 466 U.S. at 510-11.
183 See, eg., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
184 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. To alleviate such distortion, commenta-
tors have proposed permitting a sort of declaratoryjudgment for the government. Equal
advocacy at the appellate level would ensure symmetrical development of the criminal hw,
while saving defendants from an interminable exposure to uncertainty regarding their fate.
Some states provide for such declaratoryjudgments. "A fcw [states] have allowed the state
to appeal the disputed claim only as a means of clarifying future proceedings without af-
fecting the present defendant; the enthusiasm with which the prosecution will utilize such
procedure is open to doubt." Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 76, at 10 (citing State v.
Gray, 111 P.2d 514 (Okla. 1941)); see also Leipold, supra note 79, at 261 n.22 (citing to
Kansas and Nebraska statutes permitting such declaratory judgments).
185 SeeS. REP. No. 91-1296, at 24 (1970). "Where to the contrary... the judge's opin-
ion indicates unmistakably that the purported 'acquittal' is in reality founded on a determi-
nation that the underlying statute is unconstitutional, the labeling of it as an acquittal
would not, and obviously should not, prevent it from being appealed." Id.
186 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985).
187 See, e-g., Scalia, supra note 155, at 1178, 118081.
188 See, e-g., Andrew Crispo Gallery v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1996) (Thus,
findings based upon an 'improper standard'... , or 'a misunderstanding of the governing
rule of law' ... may be corrected as a matter of law." (citations omitted)); Greenapple v.
Detroit Edison Co., 618 F.2d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Since the only issue presented
concerns the application of a legal standard to undisputed facts, we have a vntage point as
commanding as the court below, and are therefore free to reject its conclusions."); Louis,
supra note 152, at 1003 n.73 ("[Slome courts of appeal... say that if the historical facts are
not in dispute, the ultimate fact is a question of law."). Professor Louis takes issue with this
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Export Corp.,lS 9Judge Friendly cited to "this court's long-held position"
that application of law to fact is a question of law, reviewable de
novo. 190 In American Tobacco Co. v. United States,'" the Supreme Court
explicitly applied law to facts in a criminal case: "The present opinion
is not a finding by this Court one way or the other on the many closely
contested issues of fact. The present opinion is an application of the
law to the facts as they were found by the jury .... ,"192
Little precedent exists on the subject of prosecutorial appeals,
and on where precisely the law-fact distinction ought to lie in this par-
ticular context. As the Lynch dissent noted, the issues presented em-
bodied a case of first impression. 193 Given the policy arguments this
Note proffers, the application of law to fact should remain a question
of law in acquittal appeals.
3. Competence
Another important criterion in making the law-fact distinction is
the competence of the decision maker.194 In a naked evaluation of
generic competence, panels of appellate court judges are generally
viewed as superior decision makers in the application of law to fact. '"
view, grounding his disagreement in the Seventh Amendment and the jury's putative in-
sight into ordinary life. See id. At the very least, these considerations have little place in
evaluating the scope of review for a bench trial.
189 588 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1978).
190 Id. at 7-8.
191 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
192 Id. at 787. This application of correct law to facts that were previously determined
by an underlying decision maker is all thatJenkins's sifting really requires. See, e.g., United
States v.Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1975), overruled by United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82
(1978); see also supra note 172 (discussing Certifled Grocers).
193 See United States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330, 334 (2d Cir. 1998) (Cabranes, J., dissent-
ing) ("The case before us is one of first impression .... .").
194 See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1985).
195 See Louis, supra note 152, at 1013-14; Murphy, supra note 158, at 971 (citing the
opportunity for "reflective dialogue and collective judgment" by circuit panels); Ellen E.
Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding 40 U. K. L. Rxv. 1, 14-16, 33-34 (1991)
(emphasizing the "fairness" and "efficiency" of appellate law declaration and application to
fact (citing Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991))); cf. Louis, supra note
152, at 1010-11 (suggesting that expertise does not justify deference to agencies and
juries).
Because exposure to witnesses is unique to the trial, appellate competence is dinin-
ished where evaluations of witness "credibility and demeanor" are decisive. See Miller, 474
U.S. at 116-17; Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 547-75 (1985). Rule 52(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court overturned precedent that
accorded deference only to inferences and findings informed by credibility judgments.
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574; Louis, supra note 152, at 1000. Yet, in the criminal context,
where no analogue to Rule 52(a) constrains appellate review, cases in favor of "de novo
review over findings not based on credibility determinations" weigh in favor of broadly
construing findings of law to permit review. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 (citing Lydle v.
United States, 635 F.2d 763, 765 n.1 (6th Cir. 1981); Swanson v. Baker Indus., Inc., 615
F.2d 479, 483 (8th Cir. 1980); Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950)).
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Additional scrutiny may be especially appropriate where there is any
suggestion a particular decision maker is uniquely incompetent. '4
Appeal is the primary mechanism for preventing and correcting
trial error.'9 7 When the trial error is material to the verdict, argu-
ments in favor of review become extremely compelling.
To permit a trial court to end a federal prosecution without possibil-
ity of review runs directly counter to the principles.., of appellate
review. In our system, the privilege to be infallible is bestowed only
along with the coincidence of finality, and the Supreme Court is the
only federal court whose word is final.' 98
Appeal furthers the correction of inadvertent errors.' 9 - Appellate re-
view also permits the correction of willful error, or nullification.
A decision maker nullifies the law when she purposefully passes
judgment on the basis of considerations other than existing law.
While the law derives great strength from judicial ingenuity, review
ensures that the mutation of legal doctrine is an orderly evolution.
Permitting judicial nullification raises grave doubts as to the accuracy
and credibility of the culpability determination. A judge whose rul-
ings are founded in personal prejudice impugns her own compe-
tence. Her decisions should be accessible to review.2- 0
In Lynch, the court of appeals failed to classify thejudge's applica-
tion of law to fact as an inquiry of law, despite the facially apparent
196 See, eg., Louis, supra note 152, at 1002, 1015-16 & nn.159, 160.
197 See Dalton, supra note 63, at 69; Sauber & Waldman, supra note 178, at 452-53.
Error can be defined tautologically as a heteroclite interpretation of law. Thus, appeal
corrects error by imposing homogeneity. Cf id. at 453 ("Appeals help assure uniformity
and evenhandedness."). This homogeneity is the very foundation ofjustice and law. Deny-
ing appeal of heteroclite law defiles the ideal of an impartial judge trying successive liti-
gants by the same standard.
198 Sauber & Waldman, supra note 178, at 434. As discussed at note 88 and accompa-
nying text, supra, significant distortions of the substantive law may occur where review is
asymmetrical. For example, the standard for pre-verdict directed judgments of acquittal
under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is currently unreviev.ible. e
Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 145 (1962) (Clark,J., dissenting) (asserting the
trial court's exercise of Rule 29 was inappropriate); Sauber & Waldman, supra note 178, at
435 & n.8 (citing district court cases directing verdicts inappropriately "despite ... the
clear language of [Rule 29]").
199 See Sauber & Waldman, supra note 178, at 452-53.
200 Of course, appellate review is no panacea for nullification. Indeed, it may be all
too easy for a wily trial judge to smuggle her nullification in through more subtle means.
For example, by making a false finding of fact based directly on a uiunesses's testimony, a
trial judge can easilyjustify an inaccurate decision ithout resort to legal distortion. Se
Dalton supra note 63, at 88-89 & n.90; Louis, supra note 152, at 1015. However, inquiries
into the psychology of nullifying judges and the means by which they nullify are far beyond
the scope of this Note. Cf Dalton, supra note 63, at 88-91 (providing a glib foray into the
psychology of trial judges regarding appeal).
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legal error and the strong suggestion of judicial nullification.201
Unique appellate competence, particularly in cases suggesting judicial
nullification, strongly favors appellate review.
4. Judicial Economy
Judicial economy is a related consideration that sometimes favors
calling an inquiry factual rather than legal. 20 2 For example, in Weidner
v. Thieret, Judge Posner declined jurisdiction at the court of appeals
level, where a district court had already applied plenary review to a
state court decision.203 Naturally, political tax cuts and budget balanc-
ing limitjudicial resources. But a distinction exists between appropri-
ately thrifty judicial economizing, like Judge Posner espouses in
Weidner, where a lower court had already examined a state decision,
and the miserly dispensation of jurisdiction, which denies review en-
tirely. While limited judicial resources may justify judicial economiz-
ing, false necessity should not deform justice. Appeal is provided for
criminal defendants. 20 4 Judicial economy does not weigh against pro-
viding a secondary forum for the accused. The expense of asymmetry
may be by far the greater.20 5
5. Double Jeopardy Policies
Finally, the policies against the double jeopardy prohibition of
acquittal appeals favor broadly discerning inquiries as legal. Society's
interest in accurate criminal trials, externalities such as the possible
distortion of substantive criminal law, and the danger of nullification
all favor limiting double jeopardy protections in the appellate
context.206
The second, synthetic, prong of the law-fact test is flexible, partic-
ularly in the application of law to fact. Because of this flexibility, de-
spite the relatively well-defined analytic categories of law and fact,
201 A further rationale offered in favor of granting appeals generally is that appellate
oversight increases public perceptions of fairness. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 63, at 98-101;
Sauber & Waldman, supra note 178, at 454-55.
202 See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985); Weidner v.
Thieret, 866 F.2d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.). If the value of an individual proce-
dure is greater than its cost, the judicial-economy syllogism may demonstrate only the nc-
cessity of allocating greater resources to the judiciary.
203 866 F.2d at 961 ("The fact that Miller requires the federal district court to take a
fresh look at the issue... does not entail that we should do so as well.").
204 The Double Jeopardy Clause, on the other hand, generally prevents review of ac-
quittals. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); Fong Foo v. United States, 369
U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192, 198 (1957);
2A WRIGHT, supra note 97, § 468, at 315.
205 "The community incurs an incalculable expense when the vast machinery con-
structed to bring criminals to justice can be felled by the simple error of a single unrevlew-
able judge." Shapiro, supra note 59, at 906.
206 See supra Part I.B.1-3.
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classifying inquiries as legal or factual is often a naked allocation of
decision-making power between appeals and trial courts. In these cir-
cumstances, to call a determination "factual" provides no more insight
than to establish the inquiry is a jury question.20 7 Synthetically, and
analytically, the Lynch appeal raised questions which would have impli-
cated no further fact-finding.
CONCLUSION
Legal and policy issues weigh in favor of permitting acquittal ap-
peals of purely legal errors. Legally, Supreme Court precedent con-
sistenfly sanctions appellate review of legal errors which would require
no further fact-finding. Policy-wise, the prohibition of acquittals ap-
peals fails to resolve the problems which prompted it, and causes
other problems. Thus, for example, judicial nullification is fostered
and protected from review. Permitting review of purely legal errors
redresses many of the difficulties raised by the prohibition.
Despite precedent and policy, appellate courts have yet to permit
an acquittal appeal which implicates no further fact-finding.203 The
exception to the prohibition of acquittal appeals, authorized in the-
ory, is forbidden in practice. One reason for this may be the mechan-
ics of applying appellate law to trial facts. Under the pure law
exception, an appellate court must apply the correct law to the previ-
ously determined trial facts. The trial facts must be "sifted" or sepa-
rated from the erroneous trial law. The process of fact-sifting, or
separating the trial facts from the erroneous trial law, turns out to be a
routine appellate tool. The law-fact distinction often sanctions appel-
late applications of law to previously determined facts. Many applica-
tions of law to fact should be deemed legal inquiries for purposes of
determining whether an appeal of an acquittal is permitted.
The requirement, under the pure law exception, that a defen-
dant be subject to no further fact-finding means simply that there
shall be no remand to a trial level decision maker, but determinations
appropriate for the court of appeals shall lie with the court of ap-
peals.209 Thus, in Canada, where prosecutorial appeals on "a question
of law alone" are permitted, the flexibility of the law-fact distinction
can sanction broad appellate review.2 10 By liberally construing inquir-
ies as legal, as law-fact distinction jurisprudence recommends, courts
of appeals can review acquittals consistent with constitutionaljurispru-
207 See Weiner, supra note 154, at 1868-69.
208 See supra notes 25 and 122 and accompan)ing text.
209 See United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975), ovemild b)- United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
210 See Freeman, supra note 45, at 21 (quoting Sunbeam Corp. (Can.) v. The Queen,
[1969] 2 S.C.R. 221 (Can.)).
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dence. In another circuit, or on another try in the Second Circuit, the
pliability of the law-fact distinction offers significant opportunities to
appeal acquittal legal errors.
